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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EDWARD HAROLD SCHAD, JR.,
Petitioner,
-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warden Utah
State Prison,
Respondent.

Case No.
12485

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial
court denying petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Peitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court denying his Writ of Habeas Corpus.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 7 :30 p.m. on July 5, 1968, Lynda Lea Olson
discovered the nude body of her brother, Clare OdeJl
.Mortensen, in a closet in his apartment on the lower
AYenues in Salt Lake City, (T 112). The decedent's
hands were bound behind his back with leather thongs
and small diameter nylon cords which were tied rather
loosely and with simple overhand knots (T 118, 419).
The ankles were also bound ( T 155), and two pieces of
cloth had been tied around the face and neck ( T 157,
403) . At the time the body was found the front door
of the apartment was locked ( T 148), but the back door
was ajar ( T 105).
A post-mortem examination disclosed that the decedent had engaged in both active and passive anal
sodomy (T 405, 417), as well as fellatio (T 416) near
the time of death. Bmises and scratches were found on
the knees and legs of the deceased and there were
superficial abrasions on the penis and scrotum ( T 405).
Dr. James T. Weston, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, testified that the cause of death
was restricted venous return of blood from the brain
caused by the ligature placed about the decedent's neck
( T 408). Dr. Weston testified, however, that the ligature was not tight enough to impair the supply of blood
to the brain ( T 431). From this, Dr. Weston concluded
that the purpose of the ligatures had been to heighten
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erotic stimulus during au act of sodomy immediately
prior to death ( T 439, 655), and that the death had
been accidental ( T 494). The time of death was fixed
between noon and 10 :00 p.m. July 4, 1968 ( T 409) .
It was shown at trial that the decedent had for a
long period of time engaged in acts of anal sodomy
( T 405). In addition, he had suffered from paralysis
( T 162), which was attributed to a tumor found in the
decedent's brain (T 439). There was testimony that
the decedent had experienced frequent dizzy spells
( T 172) and had constantly used a variety of prescription drugs for his various physical ailments ( T 96, 172) .
Dr. Weston testified that the drugs and the tumor could
have contributed to the cause of death {T 435, 442).

Appellant had been seen in the company of decedent at 11 :30 p.m. on July 3, 1968 ( T 89) . A neighbor testified that she had talked with appellant outside
decedent's home at 9:15 p.m. on July 4 (T 184), but
had not seen appellant enter or leave the decedent's residence at that time {T 226). Another neighbor testified
that he had seen appellant replacing a window screen
outside the decedent's apartment at 8:15 a.m. on July 5
( T 209). Appellant testified that he left Ft. Lewis,
Washington on July 1, 1968, and arrived in Salt Lake
City at 4 :45 a.m. on July 3 ( T 470, 472). Upon his arrival he went to a cafe, where he met the decedent
( T 47 4), who invited appellant to stay at his apartment
( T 47 5) . Appellant accepted, and followed decedent
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to the apartment at 6 :00 a.m. on July 3 (T 477). Thereafter, he accompanied decedent to a loeal tavern, a
friend's house, and another tavern, returning to the
apartment at 3:00 p.m. (T 518, 519). At about 4:45
p.m., the two again left the apartment and visited two
taverns ( T 520, 522) . Decedent left appellant alone at
midnight ( T 522) and appellant accompanied three
other persons on a trip to the Great Salt Lake ( T 289,
5254). Returning at 6 :00 a.m. on July 4, appellant went
again to a tavern (T 527) where appellant testified that
the decedent carried on an intimate conversation with a
heavy-set man (T 530). The two invited appellant to
attend a rodeo with them, but appellant declined (T
531). The decedent then took appellant to another tavern and left him there at 12 :30 p.m., after which appellant testified he never saw the decedent (T 531).
Appellant left the tavern at 9:00 p.m. on July 4,
and walked to the decedent's apartment (T 533),
where he talked with the neighbor and picked up his
belongings from the back porch of the decedent's
apartment (T 536). He denied returning to the apartment and replacing a window screen on the morning of
July 5 ( T 621 ) , and the evidence indi ca ted that the
neighbor might well have been mistaken as to the description of the person who replaced the screen ( T 4678).
It was shown at trial that appellant had pur-

ch::i sed an airplane ticket to Germany ( T 273) , and that
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he had used a credit card belonging to the decedent to
obtain money with which to purchase the ticket ( T 279) .
Appellant admitted having used the credit card unlawfully ( T 623), and testified that he found it in the
pocket of a shirt which he had loaned decedent and
which decedent had returned ( T 616). There was also
testimony that appellant had discarded certain items of
the decedent's personal property at a motel where he
stayed on July 4 (T 246, 250), but appellant denied
this ( T 543).
Appellant left Salt Lake City for Germany at
10 :30 p.m. on July 5 ( T 308), and was arrested by the
military authorities in Hauau, Germany, at 11 :30 a.m.
on July 8, for being absent without leave (T 336). At
the request of the American military authorities, the
German Police recovered appellant's two suitcases and
turned them over to the military approximately one hour
after appellant's arrest (T 33). The suitcases and other
items taken from appellant were then mailed to the
United States Army Criminal Investigator at Fort
Douglas, Utah ( T 353), and were opened by a Salt
Lake City Police Officer (T 537). Certain items of
evidence taken from the suitcases, as well as the suitcases themselves, were admitted in evidence at appellant's trial over the objection of defense counsel (T
341).

At the close of the evidence, the trial court withdrew from the jury's consideration the charge of mur-
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der in the first degree ( T 690) . In its instruction to the
jury the court charged that appellant could be found
guilty of murder in the second degree if the jury believed that the killing of the decedent was committed
by the appellant during the perpetration of an act of
sodomy by appellant with the decedent (T 697, R 40).
Timely exception was taken to this instruction ( T 776777). The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder
in the second degree (R 29). Appellant's motion for a
new trial ( T 778, 785) was denied ( T 795) .
ARGU1\1ENT
POINT A
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE
APPELLANT'S S U IT CA SE S AND THE
ITEMS CONTAINED THEREIN BY THE
GERMAN POLICE, THE U.S. ARMY, AND
THE SALT LAKE CITY POLICE WERE UNLAvVFUL UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE ADMISSION INTO
EVIDENCE AT PETITIONER'S TRIAL OF'
SUCH ITEMS SEIZED D UR I N G THE
SEARCH WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR RE·
QUIRING REVERSAL.
The law is well settled that a search made by of·
ficial authorities will be reasonable under the Fourth
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Amendment only under one of the following three circumstances :
( 1) Pursuant to search warrant. Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723
( 1964)
(2) Incident to a lawful arrest. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 10 L.Ed.2d 726
( 1963)
( 3) With the consent of the owner of the
place or item searched. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 11 L.Ed.ld 856
(1964).
In the case at bar, the search made by officer Wesley
was admittedly made without a search warrant and
without the consent of appellant. Indeed no warrant or
official order was issued, even in Germany, by the
United States military authorities which directed the
seizure of the evidence in question. Accordingly, the
search of appellant's suitcases and the use of items taken therefrom in evidence against appellant at trial were
justified only if made incident to a lawful arrest.
Clearly, however, such was not the case. In a recent decision, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 89 S.Ct.
2034 ( 1969), the United States Supreme Court
examined the purpose of the rule permitting a search
incident to a lawful arrest, and noted that the rule was
one of necessity to prevent:
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(a) The destruction of evidence by the person
arrested ; and
(b) the danger to police officer inherent in a
situation where the person arrested might be
armed, and therefore potentially a threat to the
safety of the officer.
Since these two functions may be completely satisfied
by a search limited to the arrested person's body and
the area within his immediate control, the court in Chimel
declared that searches incident to a lawful arrest are
valid only if they do not extend beyond that area.
A search is "incident" to an arrest only if it is
reasonably contemporaneous therewith. In Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881 (1964), one
of the major cases relied on by the court as authority
for Chimel, the court disallowed a search of the
defendant's car as incidental to arrest, because the search
took place when the defendant was already in jail and
the car was in custody in the police garage. In this case
the Supreme Court laid down the standards for search
incidental to arrest that were reiterated in Chimel, snpra.
The court reversed stating:
"But these justifications are absent where a
search is remote in time or place from the arrest." Id at :367.
In fallowing Preston the 10th Circuit reversed in

Welch v. United States, 411 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1969),
stating "In order for a search incident to an arrest to be
reasonable, it must be contemporaneous both in time and
in place with the arrest." In Faubion v. United States,
424 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970), another 10th Circuit case,
the defendant, while in transportation from one state to
another, stopped the officers and after being advised
of his rights told them that two hand guns were
in his suitcase which the authorities had in custody. The
authorities then searched the suitcase without a warrant,
the evidence was introduced and the case was reversed
for that reason.
The reason for the Preston-Chimel standard is
to limit search incident to arrest to its position as an
exigency to be used only when it is unreasonable to require a search w a r r a n t . In the case at hand
the seizure by German a u t h o r i t i e s took place
one hour after appellant's arrest, and the search by the
Salt Lake City authorities occurred several days thereafter. Thus, both the seizure and search of the suitcases
were in no way sufficiently close in time to appellant's
arrest to be deemed "incident" thereto, and therefore
cannot be justified on that ground. This, coupled with
the fact that the suitcases were far beyond appellant's
access and control at the time of the seizure and search,
required that the authorities obtain either a search warrant or appellant's consent before proceeding with the
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search. The record is clear that they did neither. As a
result, the seizure of the suitcases by German police at
the request of United States Army authorities, and the
search by Salt Lake City Police Officials was not a
lawful search under the United States Constitution.
In Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed.2d
171 ( 1964) the Supreme Court held that a conviction
in which illegally seized evidence had been produced at
trial must be overturned unless the effect of the introduced evidence could be declared "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." This is in keeping with the common
law rule of shifting the burden to the one admitting the
prejudicial error ( l Wigmore, Evidence § 21 3rd ed.
1940).
Three years later the Supreme Court reiterated
this position of placing of the burden on the prosecution in cases of constitutional error. "Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. State of California, 386, U.S. 125, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967).
The following circuits have all granted habeas corpus
for constitutional error quoting the above language of
Chapman:
2nd Circuit

Savino v. Follettee, Warden
305 F. Supp. 277 ( S.D.
N.Y. 1969)
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3rd Circuit

Ordog v. Yeager, Warden
299 F. Supp. 321 (D.N.J.
1969)

5th Circuit

Brown v. Heyd, Sheriff
277 F. Supp. 899 (E.D.La.
1967)

9th Circuit

Imbler v. Craven, Warden
298 F. Supp. 795 ( C.D.
Cal. 1969)

The following circuits have all granted habeas
corpus for constitutional error on authority of Fahy before Chapman.
4th Circuit

Banks v. Pepersack, Warden
244 F. Supp. 675 (D. Md.
1965)

7th Circuit

Schmitt v. Burke, Warden
277 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
Wis. 1967)

8th Circuit

Craig v. Haugh, Warden
242 F. Supp. 775 (N.D.
Iowa 1965)

In Fahy, supra, the courts said,
"The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction."
In State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639 24 Utah2d 202
( 1970) on the issue of introduction of illegally obtained
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evidence, the Utah Court citing Chapman stated "there
is a presumption that such error is prejudicial." The
court further stated in Scarulrett, which was a trial to
a judge, that a jury may be more readily prejudiced
by improper evidence than a trial judge.
It would appear impossible to say that the introduction of the only physical evidence linking the defendant to the deceased did not have the effect, in the
words of Chief Justice 'iV arren, of "forging another
link between the accused and the crime charged." Fahy
supra. Thus it harly seems feasible in this case based
upon circumstancial evidence ( T 712) and tried before
a jury that the introduction of this evidence either with
or without the resulting necessity of the defendant in
explaining his possession of it ( T 569-570) coupled
with the prosecutor's use of the defendant's explanation
of his possession of these items ( T 729) could be
deemed "harmless beyond a resonable doubt" and found
not to "have contributed to the conviction. Fahy, supra.
For this reason, the conviction should be reversed.

POINT B
DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL,
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY :MADE IMPROPER INQUIRIES BEFORE THE JURY
WHILE CROSS-EXAMINING DEFENDANT
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS (T 545-548). SUCH QUESTIONING
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UNJUSTLY PREJUDICED PETITIONER'S
POSITION REQUIRING RETRIAL.
The Utah view is that a defendant can be questioned concerning past felony convictions as to the number and type of crime involved. State v. H ougensen, 91
Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936), State v. Dickson, 12
Utah-2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 ( 1961). The prosecution clearly exceed permissible examination on three fronts.
( 1) Prosecution counsel's questions on cross,
over defense counsels objection, concerning petitioners
prior discharge from the service ( T 545) were neither
probative or relevant, particularly where the defendant
was evidently of sufficient character that he was presently in the service and had been there for almost two
years.
( 2) The repeated questioning of petitioner over
defense counsels objections as to the time and place of
the admitted convictions, . - T 545-56-471 N/?r{
( 3) the prosecution's questioning of the petitioner
at some length concerning the illegal wearing of a
United States Army uniform, a fact neither shown to
be true or shown to be a felony, clearly went beyond
allowable questioning concerning felony convictions.
( T. 547)
In regard to these lines of question, none of the information pursued was of probative value nor is it rele-
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vant. In speaking of the questions concerning the alleged illegal wearing of an army uniform, the trial court
in a memorandum denying this Habeas Corpus stated,
"such an offense has no relation to murder
amidst sex perversion P 21.
"
This questioning was pursued to emphasize to
the jury that defendant had had past trouble. This testimony cast aspersions upon the defendant and implied
that because he had possibly been in trouble elsewhere, he was a person of evil character. As such, its
effect was to disgrace the defendant and show a propensity to commit crime; a method of jury persuasion
not allowed. I Warton's Criminal Evidence, Sec 233,
(12th Ed. 1955).
From State v. Dickson, supra,
The very purpose of excluding such evidence
is to prevent the prosecution from smearing an
accused by showing a bad reputation and relying on that for conviction rather than being required to produce adequate proof of the crime
in question, 12 Utah2d, at 12, 361 P.2d at 414.
As in Dickson, supra, the admission of such evidence is
of such prejudicial effect as to necessitate retrail.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that petitioner was prejudiced by the ad-
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m1ss1on of the unlawfully obtained evidence and the
questioning concerning his past this Court should grant
his Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID P. RHODE

